

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ABSTRACT and BACKGROUND INFORMATION

For Discussion of

The MEMORANDUM to the CAREER SERVICE COMMITTEE

From the DCI

Regarding the CAREER SERVICE PROGRESS REPORT of 22 January 1952

DOC	9	REV DATE	23 JUN 81	BY	029725
ORIG COMP	—	OPI	32	TYPE	01
ORIG CLASS	5	PAGES	12	REV CLASS	C
JUST	22	NEXT REV	2011	AUTH:	HR 70-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. "Eliminate....statement of policy and substitute a directive.... appointing the CIA Career Service Board /adding to the functions that of rating the Assistant Directors and Deputy Assistant Directors/."

Background

a. Those who have launched career service programs agree on the need for publicizing the program. Example: Dr. J. J. Wittner, Director of Personnel, Consolidated Edison Company, says (in "Personnel" for May 1945) "By means of articles and statements in the company's house organ, as well as by word of mouth, make the program's meaning clear to all members of the organization. Many misunderstandings can be avoided if a 'hush-hush' publicity policy is avoided."

b. There is also agreement that the success of such a program as the one proposed requires active support by the key executives. Example: "A Plan for Executive Development" of the Monsanto Chemical Company contains the statement "The program must be actively supported by top management". Also: [REDACTED] addressing the CIA Career Development Conference on 20 February, says "One essential is a real conviction and determination on the part of the top man that he wants to do this badly enough to really work for it....In my opinion, responsibility for this Program could not be delegated below the level of the top man's Deputy."

25X1A9a

Discussion

The proposed policy statement was devised as a means of publicizing within CIA the Career Service Program (see a. above) and of demonstrating the active support and sponsorship of the program by the DCI (see b. above).

Recommendation

a. That a CIA Regulation in the General [REDACTED] be prepared for the signature of the DCI establishing the CIA Career Service Board and the Office Career Service Boards and stating briefly the purpose for which the Boards are being established.

25X1A

b. That a CIA Regulation in Correspondence and Procedures series, [REDACTED] be prepared for the signature of the DD/A giving in greater detail the responsibilities and procedures to be followed by the several Boards.

25X1A

c. That the Regulations be classified no higher than Restricted and be given widest possible distribution, i. e., Distribution No. 5.

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. "Rewrite Tab C eliminating the introduction and providing separate programs for the following classes of personnel:

- A. Clerical and Administrative....
- B. Specialists....
- C. Professionals....

Generally speaking, normal Civil Service procedures provide adequately for the career benefits of Classes A and B. The problems which are special to this Agency, as contrasted with other agencies of Government, relate basically to Class C, though it must also be recognized that in some cases people rated within Class A, and even in Class B, will perform functions comparable with those of Class C and, for our purposes, should therefore be placed in the Class C program."

Background

The Career Service Program planned by the Committee and the Working Groups has, to date, embraced the following principles:

- a. Elimination of the "elite corps" concept.
- b. Intent to make a career of civilian employment in CIA.
- c. "Proven" service demonstrated by performance on the job.
- d. To those who have not yet qualified under b. and c., would be applied personnel, management and training practices of the highest order consistent with Civil Service - and other Government - usages under existing law and without invoking to any marked degree the special powers of the DCI.
- e. To those who have qualified under b. and c., would be applied the careful and meticulous planning of their careers on a long-range basis invoking the special powers of the DCI, to whatever extent is legally, ethically and practically justified, to develop, train and exploit the latent talents of the individual in long-range interest of CIA and to make service with CIA so attractive that he will not seek other employment.
- f. It is not possible to establish without additional legislation a "commissioned service" such as the Foreign Service, the Public Health Service, the Coast and Geodetic Service, etc.; nor is it probably desirable, since required flexibility would have to be sacrificed.

Discussion

- a. The Classification Act of 1949 (P. L. 429) repealed the Classification Act of 1923 as amended and changed a basic concept of job classification in Government. Three series of jobs were combined

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

into one because

- (1) borderline cases were so numerous as to cause inefficient administration,
- (2) "crossing over" and advancement were impaired, and
- (3) morale was improved by elimination of intangible class and status distinctions.

The change, after 25 years' use, was that the

Clerical Administrative and Fiscal Service (CAF series),
Subprofessional Service (SP series), and
Professional and Scientific Service (P series)

were eliminated and combined to form a

General Schedule (GS series).

b. The Department of State would appear to have adopted a long-range program of eliminating, or at least reducing to the greatest extent possible, compatible with existing law and tradition, the distinctions between the Foreign Service and the Departmental (Civil) Service on the one hand and, within the Foreign Service, the distinction between Foreign Service Officers (FSO), Foreign Service Reserve Officers (FSRO) and Foreign Service Staff (FSS), in the latter of which there are two further distinctions - Officers (Class 1 to 9 inc.) and Employees (Class 10 to 22). This Program is the result of recommendations to that effect by the Hoover Commission and the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel (the Rowe Committee). Departmental Announcement 47 announcing the "Directive to Improve the Personnel Program of the Department of State and the Unified Foreign Service of the United States" says

- (1) adjustments will be made within the framework of the Foreign Service Act of 1946,
- (2) the Department favors and will promote entrance of Civil Service departmental employees into the Foreign Service,
- (3) the Foreign Service Officer class will be increased and the Reserve and Staff classes decreased, and
- (4) while total integration is not now possible, the Department will move toward the ultimate objective of a fully-integrated service.

All of these moves are designed to eliminate the various "classes" of personnel to which the Department is now bound both by law and by tradition.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

c. The Committee and Working Groups have recognized that there would be many "job patterns" and "job ladders" and that there would be fewer, but still a considerable number of "job families". Many different programs would be established by the Career Service Boards to further the development of individuals belonging to these numerous "job ladders". The programs would not be formally identified nor the individuals formally named as belonging to specific "job families" in order to avoid the difficulties of borderline cases, crossing over and morale.

d. Diagrammatically the Committee has recommended "A" below. The requested adjustment could be diagrammed as in "B" below.

ALL PERSONNEL			
Career Service Program	Personnel Development Program	Proven Personnel with Career Intent	50%
		New Personnel and Old Personnel without Career Intent	50%
"A"			

ALL PERSONNEL		
52% Professional	33% Clerical	15% Technical
"B"		

Recommendation

That the Committee carefully examine the requested adjustment that there be established separate programs for a tripartite personnel system and, if the anticipated advantages outweigh the known disadvantages and experiences of the Department of State and the Civil Service Commission, to replan the Career Service Program accordingly.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

3. "I like the simplicity of your proposed rating form, but question whether the rated officer should see the supervisor's rating and comments on the reverse side of these reports. Such comments should be confidential. It is proper, however, to have the rating officer state that he has discussed any shortcomings with the officer."

Background

- a. In general practice, a "rating form" is not shown to the employee.
- b. The Working Group preparing this form avoided a "rating form" as such and designed the "Personnel Evaluation Report" so that it would be shown to the employee and form the basis of supervisor-employee discussion of responsibilities and performance.
- c. With this in mind, the form omits those aspects of a rating which generally are not shown to the employee, i. e., ratings of specific factors such as drive, imagination, mentality, leadership, etc., and estimates of promotion potential.
- d. The form includes only those items which the Working Group felt could and should be shown to the employee, i. e., particular strengths and weaknesses; ways to improve present performance, and proposed development program for the individual. The supervisor would clear his statements with the reviewing official before he discusses them with the employee.
- e. Having the employee see and sign the form ensures that adequate discussion of performance takes place. In discussing performance the supervisor may get off on the wrong foot and antagonize the employee. The form is designed to guide and help him in the discussion.
- f. The Working Group strongly recommended that the Offices of Personnel and Training collaborate in preparing supervisory training material to aid supervisors in carrying out these discussions with employees.

Discussion

The Working Group recommended that the proposed Evaluation Report be immediately installed throughout CIA and that it be revised, if necessary, after one year's experience had been acquired. The question of whether any form additional to the Personnel Evaluation Report would be required by the Career Service Boards in making their decision regarding rotation, etc., was referred to the Working Group on Personnel Development Program. In view of the impasse concerning the legal position of CIA and with respect to the Performance Rating Act of 1950, that Working Group deferred action on three items of its agenda relating to this problem until it could receive policy guidance from the Career Service Committee.

Recommendations - There are three alternatives, i. e.,

- a. Adopt the recommendation that the Personnel Evaluation Report be installed now and revised later.
- b. Devise now a "rating form" that will be supplementary to the Personnel Evaluation Report.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

4. "The Class C program [professionals, i. e., officers] should be applied to all professional intelligence officers from the time they enter the service and the program should determine the system of selection, training, promotion, and rewards. Written agreement of the intent to make a career with the Agency should not be required nor do any special security concurrences seem necessary as part of this program. The intent to follow the career of intelligence officer must exist and will be a matter of primary concern to the Career Board."

Background

a. There are two schools of thought with respect to the declaration of intent to make a career in CIA. Apparently the two schools are irreconcilable. One holds that a signed statement of intent is "a scrap of paper", unenforceable, and is "an invitation to perjury". The other school holds that while such a document is, of course, unenforceable legally it is valuable as a psychological tool that forces an individual to think about his long-range relationship to CIA. If he has signed such a statement with his tongue in his cheek and this deception is discovered it is an important revelation of the individual's character. The Agency's plans for this individual can be appropriately modified. A declaration of intent, such as the one which has been proposed, is admittedly good only as of the day on which it was signed in the same way that a security clearance is only good as of the day it was issued.

25X1A

b. The concept of a declaration of intent, however, has already been approved as Agency policy in CIA Regulation No. [redacted] signed by the Deputy Director of Administration, effective 21 February 1952, in connection with Requests for Non-CIA Training. Paragraph A. (2) (g) requires a "Statement that it is the present intention of the employee to make a career of employment with CIA." This statement would be signed by the Assistant Director or Office Head whose employee was being considered for extra CIA training.

Discussion

a. It has been recognized by all persons who have seriously considered this problem that, in view of the security regulations regarding disclosure of CIA mission, procedures, etc. to applicants for employment, it is unintelligent to expect any employee when he enters on duty to be able to make a decision as to whether he intends to make a career of employment by CIA. It is for this reason that the question of intent has, by those planning this phase of the program, been postponed until approximately two years have elapsed after EOD.

b. If the statement "The intent to follow the career of intelligence officer must exist and will be a matter of primary concern to the Career Board", is valid and no statement of intent is made by the individual, the Career Boards will have to devise some other way of establishing whether the intent exists or not.

c. With respect to the "system of selection" the Working Group on Trainees has in final draft a report to the Committee recommending a system of selection for all junior Intelligence Officers.

Recommendations - None

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2001/07/31 : CIA-RDP80-01826R000400050012-4

SECURITY INFORMATION

5. "In view of the conflict between the conception of tenure in academic fields and the provisions of Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, no reference to "tenure" should be made in the program at this time. The positive idea of security in office during good behavior and effective performance of duty is implicit in the career program itself."

Background

There has been no thought at any time that "tenure" would conflict with the right of the DCI to "....terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States...." (Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947).

Discussion

The word "tenure" occurs only in Tab C of the Committee's Progress Report to the DCI. Paragraph 3F: "It [CIA] must, therefore, make its career service incentives - such as advancement, tenure and retirement - strong enough to attract and hold many persons who want jobs that are not run-of-the-mine government chores in a tidy and secure niche cemented to a single geographical point." This is in connection with the "written agreement to serve in domestic or overseas CIA posts....". Since there is question before the Committee as to whether there should be any written agreement at all, the question of using the word "tenure" here is somewhat academic. Paragraph 4A: "Codification of rights and benefits so that the employee knows where he stands and what he may reasonably plan for. These should include preferential advancement, tenure and retirement for those in the Development Program."

Recommendations

a. That the word "tenure" be eliminated from the vocabulary of the Career Service Program.

b. That in an appropriate place in the Committee's Final Report, positive statement be made to the effect that since the DCI has the right under Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 to discharge persons at his discretion, the word "career" as used in CIA does not imply any limitation on that right.

Approved For Release 2001/07/31 : CIA-RDP80-01826R000400050012-4

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

6. "I do not wish to provide additional pay for hazardous duty as part of the career service benefits (Part II of your Tab E) and would limit the meritorious award system to Classes A and B under 2 above.... I would at this time eliminate the recommendation relating to special compensation to dependents of personnel engaged in hazardous duty who are themselves exposed to hazard, and the recommendation relating to death gratuities to dependents of CIA personnel whose death occurs overseas....".

Background

a. Hazardous duty pay has not been considered by the Working Group on Career Benefits to be a benefit inherent in the Career Service Program. Rather is it an emolument that should be paid to any employee exposed to hazardous duty. The recommendation was developed by this Working Group only because it was informed and competent to deal with the problem. Hazardous duty pay is urgently needed.

b. The meritorious award system for recognition of distinguished service to the Agency was devised on the principle that an honor award should be made without regard to the status of the individual as an "officer" or a "private". If there is to be a system of recognizing distinguished service for clerks and technicians, there probably should also be some system for recognizing distinguished service among professional people.

Discussion

a. Legislation respecting pay for persons who are detained involuntarily by foreign governments (Missing Persons Act) will probably be easy to obtain.

b. Legislation for a more liberal retirement system and for an adequate leave system for overseas employees will be very much more difficult to obtain.

Recommendations

a. That additional pay for hazardous duty be eliminated from the Career Service Program and forwarded to the Deputy Director for Administration for action. (a. of Tab E).

b. That the honor award system for all employees meriting honor recognition be reconsidered. (b. of Tab E).

c. That legislation respecting the "Missing Persons Act" be vigorously pursued in collaboration with the Department of Defense. (f. of Tab E).

d. That legislation respecting the following matters not be sought during the present year:

- (1) Application to dependents of the principles of the U. S. Employees Compensation Act. (d. of Tab E).
- (2) Death gratuity of six months' pay to dependents.
- (3) More liberal retirement system. (g. of Tab E).
- (4) Adequate leave system for overseas employees. (h. of Tab E).

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2001/07/31 : CIA-RDP80-01826R000400050012-4

7. "It would be helpful to have ~~more~~ specific suggestions as to what is meant by rotation, answering such questions as:

- "A. Do you recommend limiting overseas duty to any particular number of years?
- "B. Do you recommend bringing all foreign personnel home, say, one year in each four or at any other intervals?
- "C. Do you recommend moving officers as a matter of policy from Office to Office within the Agency or do you mean from division to division within an Office?
- "D. At what rank does the rotation by the Career Service Board stop?"

Background

The DCI comment above was made without benefit of the Final Report of the Working Group on Rotation which was received by the Career Service Committee on 30 January 1952, after the Committee made its Progress Report to the DCI on 22 January 1952. Answers to the above questions are largely contained in this report.

Discussion

In brief, the answers to the four questions posed by the DCI, based on the report of the Working Group, are as follows:

To "A": Overseas duty would not be limited to any particular number of years; depends on circumstances revolving about the qualifications of the individual and the needs of the Agency.

To "B": Generally speaking, all overseas personnel would continue to receive home leave (i. e., every two years) as well as receiving periodic tours of duty at headquarters. It is highly important that there should not be created the concept of a headquarters group and an overseas group.

To "C": There should be no policy that would preclude moving officers from Office to Office within the Agency, or from division to division. Such rotation depends on the individual. A small number of key officers should be rotated from Office to Office in order to fit them for top executive positions on an Agency-wide basis. As a matter of policy these officers should never be identified by name as a selected group. Knowledge of their identity should be limited to the Office of the DCI and to the CIA Career Service Board. Rotation of officers from division to division within an Office should be primarily the responsibility of that Office, depending on its needs and the qualifications of the individuals concerned.

To "D": As a matter of policy no limit on rank should be set at which rotation stops. The greatest flexibility should be maintained and decisions on rotation by the Career Service Boards should be based exclusively on the needs of the Agency without respect to any arbitrary limitation.

Recommendations

That the Report of the Working Group on Rotation be incorporated in the Final Report of the Career Service Committee and that answers to the four specific questions be based on the discussion above.

Approved For Release 2001/07/31 : CIA-RDP80-01826R000400050012-4

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2001/07/31 : CIA-RDP80-01826R000400050012-4

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

8. "....the CIA Career Service Board should....act as the rating board for all AD's and DAD's, and....the AD, DAD, and one of the division chiefs on a rotation basis....act as the rating board for the other staff or division chiefs. For officers below the grade of staff or division chief, your Office boards would function but....add as a member in each Office one officer below the grade of a division head and....have each Office board include at least one member selected from another Office, if only as an observer."

Background

a. The Working Groups, in creating the Career Service Boards, considered that they would not be "creators" of personnel evaluations but that they would be the principal "users" of these evaluations.

b. Appraisal by boards and multiple appraisals by several persons on a higher echelon was seriously considered by the Working Group. These techniques are used in various industries. However, the Working Group decided against such a system for two reasons: (1) The compartmentalization necessary in CIA for security reasons made multiple appraisal or board appraisal impractical, and (2) Multiple or board appraisal required a larger amount of time on the part of the supervisors and CIA was, on the whole, not ready for such an advance technique nor able to devote the necessary man-hours to it.

c. The Working Group agreed, in spite of known disadvantages, that the evaluations should be made by those directly responsible in the chain of command, i.e., the immediate supervisor.

d. Having officers of a lower echelon participate in the evaluations of their superiors was studied by the Working Group. Although there is a body of opinion supporting this view, the Working Group concluded that it was unsound and violated the principle of chain of command.

Discussion

The question of observers from other Offices sitting with Office Boards was not considered by the Working Groups. It was felt that the Career Service Staff, through its aid to and collaboration with the Career Service Boards, would fulfill the need for obtaining uniformity of practice.

Recommendations

a. That the DCI evaluate the four Deputy Directors.

b. That the Deputy Directors evaluate the Assistant Directors and Office Heads within their jurisdiction and that the DCI review these evaluations.

c. That the Assistant Directors and Office Heads evaluate their Deputies and that the Deputy Directors review these evaluations.

d. That the Career Service Boards be regarded as "users" of evaluations rather than "producers" of evaluations.

e. That no officer be expected to participate in the evaluation of another officer who is on a higher echelon than himself.

f. That the Career Service Staff be the instrument of obtaining uniformity of practice rather than having members of other Offices as observers on Office Career Service Boards.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~